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Abstract 
 
 
I estimate the determinants of the demand for international reserves using quantile 
regressions. Employing a dataset of 96 developing nations over the period of 1980-1996, I find 
considerable differences at different points of the conditional distribution of reserves. The 
ordinary least squares estimates of elasticities that were found to be insignificant in previous 
studies become statistically significant at various quantiles of the reserve holding distribution. In 
particular, I find that the coefficients of interest rate differential and volatility of export receipts 
are significant and have the signs predicted by the traditional reserve models, but only for those 
nations that hold the highest amount of reserves. In contrast, the flexibility of the exchange rate 
does not seem to be an important factor for the nations that are located at the tails of the 
distribution. 
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I. Introduction 
 What determines a nations’ demand for international reserves? A majority of the empirical 
studies that examine the determinants of demand for reserves rely on the so-called ‘buffer stock’ 
model, developed in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Heller, 1960; Kenen and Yudin, 1965; Kelly, 
1970; Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981). The model posits that central banks choose an optimal level 
of reserves to balance the costs of the macroeconomic adjustment incurred in the absence of 
reserves, with the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Accordingly, the model predicts that trade 
openness and increased volatility of external disturbances increases the need for reserves. On the 
other hand, higher domestic interest rates, relative to the rest of the world, will lower the demand, 
as they are associated with an increase in the opportunity cost. Less flexible exchange rate 
regimes should also require higher levels of reserves to maintain exchange rate stability.  
A common empirical approach used to test the buffer stock model is to estimate a constant 
demand elasticity model by including the aforementioned factors as the right hand side variables 
in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Recent examples of this approach, however, 
present mixed results when applied to a large sample of developing nations. The volatility of 
disturbances, measured as the volatility of export receipts, and the opportunity cost, measured as 
the differential between the domestic and US treasury bill interest rates, are found to be 
insignificant or enter the regressions with the wrong signs (e.g. Edison, 2003; Aizenman and 
Marion, 2004; Aizenman and Lee, 2007). Apart from these results, we also see that large reserve 
holders do not decrease their reserve holdings when they move to a relatively more flexible 
exchange rate regime. This was witnessed in the advanced nations after the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, but it is also being witnessed today in the emerging markets. 
One key assumption of the constant elasticity specification is the homogeneity of the demand 
parameters across the sample. The OLS regression estimates the mean effect of the explanatory 
variables on the demand for international reserves and does not take full account of the 
heterogeneity in the sizes of reserve holdings across countries. In other words, the coefficients of 
the explanatory variables, or elasticities, are assumed to be identical regardless of the level of 
reserves.  
The distribution of reserve holdings across developing nations is, however, hardly 
homogenous. A small number of nations hold disproportionately larger amounts of international 
reserves compared to the rest of the developing world. Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution 
of the reserve holdings (deflated by the US GDP deflator) in a sample of 96 developing nations in 
1996. The top 20% of the reserve holders hold approximately 90% of the developing countries’ 
reserve holdings. More dramatically, the top 5 largest reserve holders hold more than 44% of the 
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total reserve holdings in 1996 (the leading nation is China ,with one billion dollars of reserves). It 
is also worth noting that the largest reserve holders are among the emerging markets.  
Earlier studies that examine the demand for international reserves during the 1960’s also 
found significant differences between the demand functions of more open and less open nations 
(Kelly, 1970) and developed and developing nations (Kelly, 1970; Frenkel, 1974). The factors 
that differentiate these nations during the 1960s are similar to the factors that differentiate various 
developing nations in the 1980s and 1990s. If the demand for international reserves does not have 
a constant slope or a constant elasticity, then a sample including a large number of developing 
countries will provide limited information. Moreover, large reserve holders act as outliers in the 
OLS regression and possibly influence the results. Excluding these nations from the sample 
would defeat the purpose of the analysis, as they are generally the main motivation for 
understanding the demand for reserves. On the other hand, running a separate regression for large 
reserve holders would not work either, primarily due to the severe sample selection bias. 
In this study, I offer to re-estimate the buffer stock model using quantile regressions. The 
quantile regression method, developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), makes it possible to 
estimate coefficients of the demand functions at different points of the reserve holding 
distribution, instead of dividing them into simple categories and running separate OLS 
regressions. The method is robust to outliers and differentiates their effect from the other 
observations. Utilizing a dataset of 96 developing nations over the period 1980-1996, I employ 
the quantile regression method to test and compare demand elasticities at different quantiles of 
the distribution of reserve holdings. While the quantile regression method has become increasing 
popular in other fields of economics, there are very few studies that have applied it in the area of 
international finance. 
My results show that elasticities are significantly different for nations that are at the opposite 
tails of the distribution. I find that the main predictions of the buffer stock model hold better for 
nations that hold the highest amount of reserves. More specifically, I find that the coefficients of 
interest rate differential and volatility of export receipts are significant and have the signs 
predicted by the buffer stock model for nations that are located on the right tail of the reserve 
distribution. In contrast, the flexibility of the exchange rates has an insignificant effect on these 
nations’ demand for reserves.  
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, I review the basics of the buffer stock model 
and briefly summarize its widely used empirical specification. In Section III, I discuss the non-
constant elasticities argument. Section IV describes the quantile regression methodology and the 
dataset. Section V presents the empirical results, and Section VI concludes. 
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II. The Buffer Stock Model 
The buffer stock model is derived from the government’s welfare maximization problem 
under uncertainty. The policymaker has several policy response tools under her disposal and has 
to choose the optimal mixture to use, when the country is faced with a random external 
disturbance. The weight that the policymaker gives to the reserve policy in this mixture will 
determine the demand for international reserves. 
Consider the policy options to a fall in demand for domestic currency. The government may 
choose to contract the domestic money supply and therefore eliminate domestic resident’s excess 
demand for foreign exchange. Also known as an expenditure changing policy, this type of 
demand policy has the aim of keeping the exchange rate stable. However, it may cause instability 
in domestic income, as it may involve a sharp increase in domestic interest rates.  
An alternative is an expenditure switching policy which aims to affect the composition of a 
country’s expenditure on foreign and domestic goods. One way to do this is to let the domestic 
currency depreciate when the demand falls. This will change the relative prices between domestic 
and foreign goods, eliminate the balance of payments deficit and isolate the domestic economy 
from the external disturbance. The isolation of the domestic income, however, may not be 
possible if the domestic financial system is fragile. A sizable depreciation can cause insolvency 
for firms with large unhedged net foreign currency liabilities. In the extreme, these can 
accumulate into a domestic financial crisis and have substantial negative effects on the domestic 
income. 
Another expenditure switching policy would be to use trade barriers, like tariffs and quotas, 
or to restrict the flow of capital via capital controls. While these policies, in theory, may lower the 
impact of external disturbances, empirical studies have found that their effectiveness on 
maintaining domestic income stability is questionable1. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that 
these policies have substantial welfare costs.  
Lastly, the reserve policy response would be to allow the foreign exchange reserves to run 
down to offset the excess supply of domestic currency. Thereby, the government can maintain a 
stable exchange rate and isolate the domestic income and price level from the external 
disturbance. If the government gives sufficient weight to the reserve policy, this requires that she 
has also sufficient quantities of reserves. Holding reserves, however, is a costly venture. The 
difference between the return on liquid reserve assets and the cost of borrowing from abroad, or 
the return on domestic assets and investment, constitute the opportunity cost of reserves. 
                                                 
1
 See Edwards (1999) for a review of the effectiveness of capital controls. 
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The optimal amount of reserves will be determined by the availability of alternative policy 
options, the magnitude of costs induced by the alternative policies and the opportunity cost of 
holding reserves. The explanatory variables that are used in the estimations of the buffer stock 
model arise out of the previous discussion. The following specification estimated by Aizenman 
and Marion (2004) summarizes the empirical models: 
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where i denotes country, t denotes time, 1β  through 5β  are demand elasticities, α  is a country 
specific constant, and ε  is a random disturbance term. 
The first term in (1), the opportunity cost of reserves, should enter with a negative coefficient. 
The volatility of disturbances should have a positive coefficient. Greater variability would 
increase the risk of reserve depletion and translate into a larger variance of domestic income and 
prices. Therefore, the central banks are expected to hold a larger stock of reserves to evade the 
cost of restocking frequently. Volatility of the effective exchange rate is used as a proxy for the 
type of the exchange rate regime. Greater exchange rate flexibility is expected to lower the 
demand for reserves and the variable should enter with a negative coefficient. Openness is an 
indicator of vulnerability to external disturbances and it is expected to have a positive coefficient. 
The scale variable controls for the size of international transactions and it should enter with 
positive coefficient. Finally,α , represents the country specific factors that are not explicitly 
included in the model. 
 
III. Non-Constant Demand Elasticities  
A number of possible reasons for non-constant demand elasticities, explicit and implicit, are 
offered by the previous research: Differences in the structure of the financial or real sector, 
government’s preferences, specific macro conditions facing the economy, or institutional and 
political factors are likely to imply that there is no single demand function that characterizes all 
nations. All of these factors help determine the costs of the alternative policies, as well as their 
availability, when the country faces a random disturbance.  
In equation (1), it has been assumed that the variability of domestic income and prices is the 
major outcome of non-reserve policies. The inclusion of the volatility of disturbances and 
openness variables are based on this assumption. However, it is unlikely that the costs of non-
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reserve policies in the domestic economy would be equivalent across nations. In addition, the 
perception of the severity of costs will be subjective, depending on the preferences of the 
policymaker. This implies that when facing the same disturbance, countries may respond 
differently. In other words, demand curves across nations, and even across time periods, may not 
have a constant slope or a constant elasticity. 
Conventional OLS models throw the availability and costs of alternative policies into the 
error term, implying that their effect is additive and independent of the other determinants of the 
demand for reserves. Consider two countries; one uses a reserve policy and the other uses an 
expenditure switching policy. Holding everything else constant, one would expect a higher 
demand for reserves from the first country. In addition, facing the same volatility of disturbances, 
the second country’s demand will be inelastic. In this hypothetical situation, the usual additive 
least squares regression model will only capture the difference in reserve holdings, not the 
difference in the elasticity of demand to the volatility of disturbances.  
A few studies explicitly recognize the notion of non-constant elasticities. Grubel (1971), for 
example, states his concerns on estimating cross-sectional demand functions instead of demand 
functions for individual countries from time series. He stresses the importance of unobservable 
taste preferences and structural characteristics of economies in determining the demand for 
reserves.  Kelly (1970) provides a test for the difference in the coefficients of the main 
independent variables of the buffer stock model by running a separate regression for a divided 
sample of 46 developed and less developed economies, and more open and less open economies, 
for the period of 1953-1965. He finds that dividing the sample into two groups produce 
statistically different estimates for most of the coefficients.  
Frenkel (1974) specifically looks at the difference between the demand for reserves by 55 
developed and less-developed countries for the period 1963-1967. He shows that the demand 
parameters of the two groups were significantly different. He argues that these differences can be 
explained by the degree of sophistication of financial structures, the ability of the monetary 
authorities to satisfy the increased demand for money as an asset in the process of economic 
growth, the willingness of the government to impose direct controls on international trade, and 
the degree of access to the world capital markets. All of these factors vary largely across 
developing nations today. 
Studies that analyze the large reserve holdings during the post Bretton Woods era and the 
1990’s also offer implicit reasons for different demand elasticities. One such group of studies 
analyzes the asymmetry of the country’s adjustment behavior when reserves are below or above 
their optimal levels. For example, Claassen (1975) shows that the maximum level of reserves that 
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nations hold are always three times higher than the target level. Willett (1980) provides a public 
choice analysis of the incentives facing governments with respect to reserve policy. He argues 
that once reserves reached an adequate level, their weight in the government’s utility function 
may change. Selling off excess reserves can require actions that conflict with other economic 
objectives, for instance, by requiring appreciation. More recently, Bar-Ilan et al. (2004) and Li et 
al.(2007) show that a country might wish to accumulate reserves over a long period of time if the 
cost of adjusting reserve levels was high in relation to the cost of holding reserves. In particular, 
this group of studies offer answers to the question of why large reserve holders do not lower their 
reserve holdings when they move to a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
Another group of studies offers the precautionary demand explanation (i.e. Ben-Bassat and 
Gottlieb, 1992a; Lee, 2004; Aizenman and Lee, 2007). Reserves can provide protection against 
sudden stops of capital flows and therefore provide self-insurance for nations. Furthermore, in 
second-generation crisis models, reserve adequacy can influence the probabilities of crisis when 
countries have fundamentals in the vulnerable zone (Obstfeld 1994). Thus, countries may be 
willing to hold more reserves to deter sudden stops of capital flows and provide liquidity, if they 
happen. Aizenman (1998) also shows that precautionary demand will be especially strong if the 
government has high aversion to loss; a factor that is thrown into the error term in standard OLS 
regressions. 
Large reserves can also be caused by public finance problems. A country facing a 
combination of costly tax collection, sovereign risk and the need to finance public expenditures, 
may find it optimal to hold large reserves to smooth consumption (Aizenman and Marion, 2004).  
Finally, accumulating reserves can be a residual of an industrial policy, where the 
government is deliberately preventing the exchange rate from appreciating to promote trade 
competitiveness. This explanation is especially motivated by China’s demand for reserves in the 
1990’s (Dooley et al., 2003). Aizenman and Lee (2007), however, shows that the precautionary 
demand for international reserves explains the emerging markets’ behavior better than the 
mercantilist view after the Asian financial crisis.  
If demand elasticities vary across nations, then equation (1) will mask the potential 
heterogeneity across the distribution, due to its sole focus on the conditional mean. To allow for 
different demand elasticities, I modify (1) in the following fashion: 
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where γ is the weight given to the reserve policy.  Holding everything else constant, I will 
assume that higher levels of reserve holdings are associated with a higherγ . Each elasticity 
coefficient is a function ofγ , however, in equation (2), I do not define the function, and leave it 
to be estimated from the data. Below, I present the methodology to estimate (2). 
  
IV. Methodology and Data 
The method that would allow me to estimate equation (2) is the quantile regression developed 
by Koenker and Bassett (1978). It is an extension of the classical least squares estimation of the 
conditional mean to a collection of models for different conditional quantile functions. Since the 
introduction of the technique, a growing number of studies have applied it to estimate the effect 
of explanatory variables on the dependent variable at different points of the distribution.2  
The basic quantile regression model specifies the conditional quantile as a linear function of 
explanatory variables and is given by: 
 
εβ +′= XY
                   (3) 
( ) ( ) 10 and  <<′== θθβθ xxXYQ
               (4) 
 
where Y is the dependent variable, X is a matrix of explanatory variables,ε   is the error term and 
( )xXYQ =θ  denotes the thθ quantile of Y conditional on X = x. The distribution of the error 
termε  is left unspecified. As is implied by equation (4), it is only assumed that ε  satisfies the 
quantile restriction ( ) 0== xXQ εθ .  
The thθ regression quantile estimate, )(ˆ θβ , is the solution to the following minimization 
problem: 
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If θ =0.5, the procedure leads to minimizing the sum of absolute deviations, also known as 
the median regression. Since the median is the 50th quantile, one can apply the same procedure 
for other quantiles by changingθ . For example, if θ =0.80, then the negative residuals will have 
                                                 
2
 See Buchinsky (1998) and Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a brief survey of empirical applications.  
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less weight than the positive ones and equation (5) is minimized when 20 percent of the residuals 
are negative and we get the 80th quantile estimate. Therefore, by increasing θ  continuously from 
0 to 1, we can trace the distribution of Y, conditional on X, and obtain a much more complete 
view of the effects of explanatory variables on the dependent variable. It is also worth mentioning 
that segmenting the dependent variable (unconditional distribution) and then running an OLS on 
the subsets is not an appropriate alternative to the quantile regression, due to severe sample 
selection problems (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). 
Note that this method allows elasticities to vary by quantiles of the unobservables or by the 
quantiles of the reserve holdings. The θ th quantile of reserve holdings depends on two factors: 
the explanatory variables X and the quantile of the country conditional on X. Therefore, after 
conditioning out the effects of observed factors, X, the method will allow for comparison of the 
elasticities at different quantiles of unobservables. Furthermore, if we assume that 0< γ <1 in 
equation (2), where a higher γ is associated with larger reserve holdings, then we can also assume 
thatγ θ= . This implies that countries that are at the higher end of the reserve holding distribution 
are also the ones that yield a higher weight to the reserve policy.  
The components of X consist of the five explanatory variables from the buffer stock model 
from Aizenman and Marion (2004), presented in (1). This allows use of their publicly available 
dataset and allows for an easier comparison of estimation results.3  The unbalanced panel dataset 
consists of 96 developing countries over the 1980-1996 period.4 
It is worth mentioning that I exclude the country specific constant in the quantile regressions. 
Ideally, we would like to incorporate the country fixed effects in equation (2) however; both the 
implementation and the interpretation of country specific constants are not straightforward in the 
quantile regression framework. 5  
To estimate a fixed effects model, differencing (or demeaning) the data, as one would do 
under an OLS framework, is not appropriate for quantile regressions. As outlined in Arias et al. 
(2001) the quantiles of the sum of two random variables are not equal to the sum of the quantiles 
of each random variable. In our context, if the data is differenced, the order of the countries 
matters. In particular, quantile estimates of elasticity coefficients from a differenced equation 
would reflect the elasticity on the quantiles of the conditional distribution of within country 
                                                 
3
 Data is available at www.res.org.uk. 
4
 Due to missing data on political variables investigated, Aizenman and Marion (2004) reduce the sample to 
64 countries. Since I am interested in the core buffer stock model, I exclude the political variables and use 
the entire dataset.  
5
 Fortunately, advances are being made on this issue. See Arias et al. (2001), Koenker (2004), Lamarche 
(2006) and Canay (2008) for various approaches to the problem. 
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reserve holdings, instead of the elasticities in the quantiles of the conditional reserve holding 
distribution. 
One might be tempted to follow the alternative approach which would entail including the 
individual country dummy variables in the regression. Koenker (2004), however, points out that 
the large number of individual fixed effects can significantly inflate the variability of the 
estimates of the other explanatory variables’ effects. To quote Koenker (2004), “At best it might 
be possible to estimate an individual specific location-shift effect, and even this may strain 
credulity.” 
Apart from the implementation issues, the interpretation given to individual fixed effects is 
less appealing in quantile regression models, as the quantile regression already accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity and heterogeneous effects. For example, the examination of the data 
reveals that the size of a given country’s reserve holdings seldom falls outside a narrow range of 
quantiles. Hence, the distinction among the varying sizes of reserve holdings is lost when 
different intercept terms are allowed for each country.  
That being said, the main dependent variable, Y, is the log of reserves valued at US dollars 
divided by the US GDP deflator. As it is common in this literature, I have also used three other 
measures of international reserves as dependent variables, these are: Reserves as a ratio of broad 
money (M2), short-term debt and GDP. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables.6  The 
opportunity cost of reserves is measured by the differential between the country’s own interest-
rate and the interest rate on US treasuries. A higher interest rate differential is associated with a 
higher opportunity cost. The volatility of disturbances is measured as the standard deviation of 
the previous years’ real export receipts. Volatility of the effective exchange rate is measured as 
the standard deviation of previous years’ nominal effective exchange rate against the US dollar. 
Imports to the GDP ratio are used to measure openness to trade and the vulnerability to external 
disturbances. Population size and real GDP per capita are used as scale variables. All the 
variables enter the regression in natural log form.  
 
V. Results 
 To facilitate a direct comparison, the model is estimated first by pooled and fixed effects 
OLS regressions. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 present the OLS estimates. In both regressions, the 
coefficients of two key variables: the volatility of export receipts and the interest rate differential 
are not statistically significant. With the exception of the interest rate differential in the pooled 
                                                 
6
 See Aizenman and Marion (2004) for a more detailed description of variable definitions and data sources. 
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OLS regression, the signs of the other estimated coefficients are consistent with the predictions of 
the buffer stock model. These results are also in line with Aizenman and Marion’s findings.7 
Next, I have estimated the model for different values of θ  that allow an examination of the 
impact of the explanatory variables at different points of the distribution of the countries’ reserve 
holdings. In addition, I have also run interquantile regressions, which produce estimates of the 
difference in coefficients at adjacent quantiles. The difference estimates can be tested for 
statistical significance and therefore offer a test for the constant elasticity hypothesis.  
The quantile regression estimates are reported in Table 2 (columns 3-7). The model is 
estimated at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th quantiles. The standard errors for the quantile 
estimates are obtained by bootstrapping with 1000 replications. Table 3 presents the difference 
estimates.  
We see that there are some pronounced differences across different points in the distribution 
of reserve holdings. First, note the variables that have insignificant coefficients in the OLS 
regressions. The interest rate differential and the volatility of export receipts both enter the 
regression with statistically significant coefficients at various quantiles of the distribution. 
Second, glancing over Table 3, we see that some of the interquantile estimates for these two 
variables’ coefficients are statistically significant.  This proves that the elasticities are not 
constant across the various quantiles of the reserve distribution.  
The interest rate differential enters the regression with an insignificant and positive 
coefficient at the 5th quantile. It becomes significant, gradually falls and turns negative towards 
the right end of the distribution. At the 95th quantile, the coefficient is negative and highly 
significant as the buffer stock model suggests, but this is not true in any of the other quantiles.  
Table 3 also shows that the coefficients at the 75th quantile and 95th quantile are significantly 
different. The interest rate elasticity of demand for reserves is not constant and rises with higher 
levels of reserves. 
One interpretation of this result is that the opportunity cost of holding reserves rises at an 
increasing rate as the reserve holdings increase. However, some caveats are worth mentioning. 
Previous studies have consistently pointed out the possibility of the endogeneity of the interest 
rate differential. The direction of the bias from the endogeneity, however, is not clear. On the one 
hand, higher levels of reserves could lower the probability of an external crisis and the risk 
premium on domestic assets and lead to lower domestic interest rates (Levi-Yeyati, 2006).  In this 
                                                 
7
 Aizenman and Marion (2004) do not report the results when the interest rate differential variable is 
included in their model, but they state that it is insignificant and have entered it with the wrong sign 
(positive) in all their regressions. 
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case, we would observe a negative coefficient estimate. On the other hand, higher interest rates 
might attract large capital inflows, which, in turn, may trigger an intervention from the central 
bank to prevent currency appreciation. This would cause a positive relationship between the 
reserves and the interest rates. The sharp contrast between the coefficients at the lower and higher 
quantiles might also suggest that the causes of the endogeneity changes across the quantiles. 
The next determinant of the demand for reserves: the coefficient of the volatility of export 
receipts, is both significant and has the expected positive sign at the higher quantiles. The 
relatively large and significantly negative coefficient at the 5th quantile is difficult to explain, yet 
the coefficient is insignificant on the left side of the distribution. Furthermore, Table 3 confirms 
that the coefficient is statistically different across quantiles and increases in size as we move 
towards the right side of the distribution.8  If, at the lower quantiles of the distribution, nations 
place a lower weight on reserve policy in their reaction to random disturbances, then we expect 
their demand for reserves to be less sensitive to the volatility of international transactions. The 
sharp change in significance and sizes of coefficients at the right side of the distribution confirms 
this hypothesis. 
Another noteworthy result is the effect of the volatility of the effective exchange rate. It 
enters with insignificant coefficients at both tails of the distribution. It does, however, exhibit 
statistically significant negative signs in the middle section. In Table 3, we see that the 
coefficients at the 25th through the 75th quantiles are not statistically different from each other. 
Coefficients at the highest and lowest tail, however, as shown in Table 2, are not statistically 
different from zero. If nations at the higher end of the distribution mainly rely on reserve policy, 
due to other reasons, then we would not expect them to be sensitive to the changes in the 
exchange rate. In fact, lowering the reserve holdings after moving to a more flexible exchange 
rate regime may require substantial adjustment costs. The insignificant coefficient at the 95th 
quantile is consistent with the persistence of large reserve holdings, when nations switch to 
relatively more flexible exchange rate regimes.  
The imports to GDP variable enters with statistically significant positive coefficients in every 
quantile. Furthermore, interquantile estimates in Table 3 show that coefficients at various 
quantiles are not statistically different from each other (with the exception of the coefficients at 
the 25th and 50th quantiles). Likewise, the significance of the scale variables; population size and 
real GDP per capita, do not change. The variation in the two scale coefficients at different 
quantiles seems to offset each other.  
                                                 
8
 75th-95th quantile estimate is marginally significant (p-value of 0.12). 
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I regress several other measures of international reserves on the buffer stock variables to see 
if the results are robust. Figure 2 presents a graphical summary of the quantile regression results 
when four different measures of reserve holdings are used. Each figure plots the quantile 
regression point estimates for θ  in increments of 0.05, ranging from 0.05 to 0.95, as the solid 
curve. This solid curve illustrates the change in coefficient estimates as we move from one 
quantile to another, holding other independent variables constant. The shaded area around the 
solid line shows the 90% confidence interval constructed by the 1000 bootstrap replications. The 
solid straight line in each figure represents the fixed effects OLS estimate and the dashed lines 
above and below that line show the borders of the 90% confidence interval. 
Column (1) in Figure 2 provides a more complete picture of the elasticities presented in Table 
2. Columns (2), (3) and (4) present coefficient estimates when reserve holdings are defined as a 
ratio of broad money (M2), short-term debt and GDP, respectively. While the results from earlier 
analysis show some sensitivity to the use of reserves over the M2 ratio, most of the qualitative 
results continue to hold.  The estimates for the coefficients of volatility of export receipts are 
increasing towards the higher quantiles of the reserve holding distribution. In contrast, we see a 
decreasing pattern for the interest rate differential. The u-shaped pattern for the volatility of the 
exchange rate coefficients also continues to be observed in all four regressions. The estimates for 
the coefficients of the scale variables, and imports to GDP measure, do not exhibit a clear pattern.  
  
VI. Conclusions 
I used quantile regressions to re-estimate the buffer stock model at different points of the 
reserve holdings’ conditional distribution. I found that the parameters of the demand function 
vary across nations with different levels of reserve holdings. The results also show that some of 
the elasticity estimates that are found to be insignificant in the OLS regression, become 
statistically significant at the various quantiles of the reserve holding distribution. More 
specifically, I found that the coefficients of the interest rate differential and volatility of export 
receipts are significant and have the signs predicted by the buffer stock model for nations that 
hold the highest amount of reserves. In contrast, the flexibility of the exchange rates is not an 
important determinant of demand for those nations located at the tails of the distribution. 
These findings have several implications for future empirical research on the demand for 
international reserves. First, the results imply that the behavior of emerging markets is 
significantly different than other developing nations. This finding is due to the stylized fact that 
the largest reserve holders in the sample, nations that are at the right hand of the distribution, are 
emerging markets. Furthermore, the results show that there are significant differences in 
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elasticities, even among the emerging markets. Studies that estimate the buffer stock model using 
OLS should pay special attention to the emerging markets, possibly estimating them separately 
from other developing nations. 
Second, the results reveal the importance of the unobservable factors on the demand for 
reserves. In particular, variables that would capture the weight given by the governments to the 
reserve policy would substantially improve the explanatory power of the model. These factors 
may help explain the difference in demand behavior between emerging markets and other 
developing nations.  
Third, the sharp contrast in the coefficients of some of the estimates across the quantiles may 
be due to endogeneity, rather than heterogeneity. This possibility is especially high for the interest 
rate differential. One way to mitigate the endogeneity problem is to include country specific 
constants in the quantile regression. I have summarized the limitations of fixed effects quantile 
regressions, yet other studies on  panel data quantile regressions may help address this issue in the 
future. 
The quantile regression can provide significant improvements in our understanding of the 
demand for international reserves. Although my work has established the potential value of this 
method in this line of research, it does not explicitly explain the reasons of fast reserve 
accumulation in emerging markets or predict reserve holdings after 1996.  I leave this significant 
topic for future analysis. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of Real Reserve Holdings, 1996. 
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Figure 2: OLS and quantile-regression results using the logarithm of four alternative 
definitions of reserve holdings as the dependent variable. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Mean Median St. dev. 
Real Reserve Holdings (mil $) 25.0 2.8 66.0 
    
Reserves to M2 ratio (%) 29.5 0.2 42.6 
    
Reserves to Short-term Debt (%) 26.8 0.1 59.2 
    
Reserves over GDP (%) 9.7 0.07 12.3 
    
Interest rate differential 16.13 1.35 341.39 
    
Volatility of export 0.19 0.17 0.10 
receipts    
    
Volatility of effective  0.037 0.01 0.112 
exchange rate    
    
Imports to GDP (%) 40.6 33.9 23.8 
    
Population size (mil) 42.9 6.3 153 
    
Real GDP per capita ($) 1778.0 1127.7 1776.9 
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Table 2: OLS and quantile-regression results using the logarithm of real international 
reserve holdings as the dependent variable. 
Sample Size: 1349 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS  Quantile         
  
Pooled Fixed 
Effects 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
Interest rate  0.062 -0.03 0.172 0.134*** 0.038*** -0.012 -0.096*** 
differential (0.069) (0.038) (0.148) (0.046) (0.034) (0.039) (0.044) 
        
Volatility of   0.035 0.025 -0.542** -0.078 0.057 0.223*** 0.334*** 
export receipts (0.115) (0.064) (0.215) (0.072) (0.062) (0.069) (0.069) 
        
Volatility of effective  -0.057 -0.128*** 0.191 -0.075* -0.124*** -0.122*** -0.057 
exchange rate (0.072) (0.028) (0.131) (0.044) (0.042) (0.032) (0.038) 
        
Imports to GDP 0.689*** 0.574*** 0.673** 0.887*** 0.724*** 0.663*** 0.584*** 
 (0.151) (0.100) (0.322) (0.107) (0.076) (0.079) (0.060) 
        
Population size 1.016*** 1.568*** 0.861*** 1.026*** 1.034*** 1.0445*** 1.013*** 
 (0.047) (0.226) (0.096) (0.030) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) 
        
Real GDP per capita 1.059*** 1.785*** 1.304*** 1.067*** 1.022*** 1.021*** 1.121*** 
  (0.083) (0.148) (0.131) (0.043) (0.032) (0.031) (0.044) 
All variables enter the regressions in logarithms.  Standard errors are in parenthesis below each parameter 
estimate. Quantile regression standard errors are based on bootstrap with 1000 replications. * indicate 
statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. All 
regressions include a constant term. 
 
Table 3: Inter-quantile regression results using the logarithm of real international reserve 
holdings as the dependent variable. 
Sample Size: 1349 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Quantile       
 5th - 25th 25th - 50th 50th - 75th 75th - 95th 
Interest rate  -0.038 -0.096** -0.05 -0.084** 
differential (0.131) (0.038) (0.035) (0.044) 
     
Volatility of   0.464** 0.135** 0.166*** 0.11 
export receipts (0.210) (0.069) (0.061) (0.070) 
     
Volatility of effective  -0.266** -0.049 0.002 0.065* 
exchange rate (0.124) (0.040) (0.036) (0.041) 
     
Imports to GDP 0.213 -0.162* -0.061 -0.078 
 (0.318) (0.091) (0.070) (0.079) 
     
Population size 0.164* 0.008 0.011 -0.032 
 (0.091) (0.025) (0.020) (0.027) 
     
Real GDP per capita -0.237* -0.045 -0.0005 0.099** 
  (0.128) (0.037) (0.029) (0.041) 
Standard errors are in parenthesis below each parameter estimate. Standard errors are based on bootstrap 
with 1000 replications. * indicate statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** 
indicate significance at 1%. 
